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SPECIAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Georgia County Liability:
Nuisance or Not?
by R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*
I.
It is both historical and undeniable that local government law does not
expose all "local governments" to the same "law." At various junctures,
and for various reasons, applicable legal precepts may differ according to
the nature of the governmental beast. Moreover, those differences may
appear, disappear, converge, and diverge in seeming disorderliness, rendering the law's proverbial seamless web a forbidding fortress of analytical frustration. On occasion, the distinctions are admittedly minor; on occasion, they are of profoundly pivotal prominence.
Primarily, but not exclusively, the focused governmental entities will be
municipalities and counties.1 Belying popular modern perceptions of as* Talmadge Professor of Law, University of Georgia (A.B., 1956; LL.B., 1958); Harvard

University (LL.M., 1961). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. But this is not always the case. See, primarily in respect to local government hospital
authorities, R. Perry Sentell, Jr., "Sue and Be Sued" in Georgia Local Government Law: A
Vignette of Vicissitudes, 41 MERcan L. Rzv. 13 (1989).
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similation, history's approach to the municipal-county corpus juris tended

toward dichotomy. Buttressed by felt distinctions in governmental origin,
status, purpose, and function, myriad developments in legal principle responded to those distinctions. The inquiry "what law?" can frequently
find answer, therefore, only in yet another question: "municipality or
county?"
II.

Few issues in local government law are more important than that of
liability. Even fewer receive more attention. Responsibility for the alleged
"wrongs" of agents has long laid claim to centerpiece significance on the
local government agenda; the subject features prominently in the aspirations of claimants as well. Accordingly, legal history has forged distinctive
bodies of "law" regulating governmental accountability in such disparate
realms as tort,' civil rights violation,' nuisance,' and eminent domain."
Emerging from court decisions, statutes, and constitutional provisions,
these principles permeate the local government labyrinth in strikingly uneven thrust. Some treat municipalities and counties indistinguishably;
others differentiate the entities dramatically.'
For the law of nuisance liability in particular, it has long mattered
whether the defendant government was a municipality or a county.
Above, and aside from, the "impenetrable jungle"'7 of nuisance law itself,
county nuisance responsibility was the recipient of special legal evolution.
Unlike its treatment of municipalities, the law historically hesitated over
county nuisance liability, indicating the need for an additional reason to
impose the legal exaction. Discovering that reason in the law of eminent
domain, the saga confusingly blurred the status of the two subjects in
county law. The result clearly evidenced an obliteration of liability altogether for county nuisance per se, but in highly convoluted fashion. Thus,
2. See, e.g., R. PERRY SEzNzLL, JR., THE LAW OF MuNiciPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA
(4th ed. 1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Tort Liability: The "Crisis"
Conundrum, 2 'GA. ST. U.L, REv. 19 (1986).
3. See, e.g., R. PERRY SENTELL, JR, GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw's AssimiATroN OF
Monell: SECTION 1983 AN) Tr Nsw "PERSONS" (1984).
4. See, e.g., R. Perry Sentell, Jr., MunicipalLiability in Georgia: The "Nuisance" Nuisance, 12 GA. ST. B.J , 11 (1975).
5. See, e.g., R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Liability Limitations: "Causation"
is to Tort as "Police Power" is to Eminent Domain, Uns. GA. 20 (Jan.-Feb. 1987).
6. The differentiation goes to both substantive and procedural facets; as to the latter
compare R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Municipal Tort Liability: Ante Litem Notice, 4 GA.
L. REv. 134 (1969), with R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Claims Against Counties: The Difference A
Year Makes, 36 MERCER L. Rzv. 1 (1984).
7. The phrase belongs to Prosser, WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, ToRTs § 86
(5th ed. 1984).
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the law appeared to test the -sufficiency of "nuisance" claims against
counties by the prerequisites of "eminent domain" responsibility. Unless
claims for the former met the prescribed tests for the latter, there could
be no county liability for "nuisance." In thereby appearing to render
county nuisance a seemingly superfluous concept in local government law,
the exercise yielded two obvious ramifications. First, claimants typically

found it more difficult to establish a county "nuisance" than a municipal
nuisance. Second, even when established, the county "nuisance" typically
resulted in fewer recoverable damages for the claimant. These are crucial
ramifications, both for the overburdened county budget and for the injured "nuisance" claimant.
Not surprisingly, the described saga has been a controversial one, erratic in both substance and development, and the continuing object of
forces for change. Recently, those forces projected the matter to the renewed attention of both appellate courts, yielding, at least for the moment, a watershed climax. In an effort to briefly chronicle the episode, no
pretense at exhaustive elaboration is intended. Rather, the account will
simply sketch some of the commonly acknowledged mileposts in the historic development so that current events may be appreciated in context.
As ever, the common law process casts its all-absorbing aura of analytical
intrigue.
III.
Over one hundred years ago, the Georgia Supreme Court decided the
renowned case of Smith v. Floyd County. Plaintiff in Smith sought recovery for alleged damage to his residential lot arising from the county's
construction of a public bridge.10 Reversing the trial judge's dismissal of
plaintiff's action, a unanimous supreme court plumbed the fundamentals
of a Georgia county's legal responsibility. Although plaintiff had apparently particularized no anchor for his claim, Chief Justice Bleckley's opinion for the court advanced directly to the eminent domain provision of
the 1877 Georgia Constitution. 1 Under that provision, the Chief Justice
8. The mindset is indicated by one of the many comments attributed to Yogi Berra:
"You can observe a lot just by watching."
9. 85 Ga. 420, 11 S.E. 850 (1890).
10. Id. at 420, 11 S.E. at 850. Plaintiff alleged that the county had erected an embankment and trestle in constructing approaches to a public bridge, thereby elevating the roadway above the level of plaintiff's adjacent lot and rendering passage impossible from the
road to the lot. Id. at 421, 11 S.E. at 850.
11. "The constitution (Code, § 5024) declares: 'Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid."' 85
Ga. at 423, 11 S.E. at 850. Indeed, Bleckley emphasized, prior to the 1877 Constitution, the
law was otherwise. Id. at 424-25, 11 S.E. at 85.
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declared, "cities, counties and all other public organizations are denied
any power or right to cause such damages for public purposes without
making compensation.""3 "In this respect," he affirmed, municipalities
and counties "are all upon an equal footing," and "tthe constitution is no
less directly applicable to the one than to the other."1
No sooner had Bleckley identified the source of the county's liability
than he turned to emphasizing what the source was not. "[W]e are to be
understood as sustaining" plaintiffs claim, he asserted, "not for the purpose of treating the work or its results as a nuisance to the plaintiffs
premises.""' Rather, he delineated, the claim was upheld "only for the
purpose of recovering damages for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain." 1 In turn, Bleckley employed that delineation to confine the
measure of recoverable damages: "[T]he measure of compensation is the
actual depreciation in value (in the market value) of the plaintiffs premises, resulting from the work done and its effect upon the property.'"
The starting point is, therefore, clear. Over a century ago, the supreme
court took exquisite pains to establish a number of doctrinal propositions.
County work on a public road could inflict recoverable damage upon an
owner of adjacent land. The county's liability sounded in the constitution's eminent domain proscription, as a "taking" of private property for
public purposes. Under that proscription, the responsibility of counties
and municipalities was indistinguishable. That imposition by no means
carried over to nuisance liability, however, a point reinforced by the limitation of damages to the land's resulting depreciation in market value. In
the circumstances of Smith, therefore, the supreme court embraced
county responsibility in eminent domain; it was equally emphatic in
shunning the potential of nuisance.
Roughly a decade later, but still prior to the turn of the century, the
17
supreme court revisited its Smith exercise in Barfield v. Macon County.
Plaintiff in Barfield alleged that county work on the public roads caused
water to overflow her adjacent land, resulting in diminishment of the
property's market value.18 Reversing the trial judge's dismissal of the
claim, the court relied squarely upon, and quoted extensively from, its
12. Id. at 425, 11 S.E. at 851.
13. Id.
14. Id. "The work done is to be treated as rightful in all respects save in the omission to
pay compensation." Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 109 Ga. 386, 34 S.E. 596 (1899).
18. Id. at 386, 34 S.E. at 596. Plaintiff alleged that county workers changed the road so
that water which originally would not have flowed onto plaintiff's property subsequently did
so. Id.
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opinion in Smith." As for recoverable damages, the court was likewise
explicit:
(W]e desire to apply the rule laid down in... Smith.... and we adopt
the following language of Chief Justice Bleckley: "In holding that the
declaration sets forth a cause of action, we are to be understood as sustaining it, not for the purpose of treating the work or its results as a
nuisance to the plaintiff's premises, but only for the purpose of recovering damages for the exercise of the power of eminent domain."''
Poised on the threshold of the new century, therefore, the supreme
court had drawn, and redrawn, a bright line of demarcation in the Georgia law of county liability. What the line excluded was fully as intriguing
as what it included: at a minimum, the delineation declared, the principles of eminent domain and nuisance were far from fungible.
IV.
On occasion, the supreme court has reflected generally upon the respective liability postures of Georgia municipalities and counties.21 A distinction with a difference at the common law, the court has reasoned, went to
the capacity in which the local government was legally capable of acting.2'
Counties functioned exclusively in matters of "sovereignty," the court has
explained, with the result that "at common law a suit could not be maintained against a county at all."' s In contrast, municipalities historically
acted in a "dual capacity," being delegated not only their sovereign powers, but "powers of ministerial or proprietary character" as well."' Municipal liability would attach for the latter actions, the court has noted, but
not the former. Over time, the municipality's posture remained relatively
unmodified while the county's immunity yielded to the extent that suits
could be brought when "authorized by express constitutional or statutory
authority.""e
19. Id. at 387, 34 S.E. at 596.
20. Id. at 388, 34 S.E. at 597 (quoting Smith v. Floyd County, 85 Ga. 420, 425, 11 S.E.
850, 851 (1890)). Again, the supreme court was unanimous.
21. One such well known occasion was the court's opinion in Purser v. Dodge County,
188 Ga. 250, 3 S.E.2d 574 (1939), in which the court answered a certified question from the
court of appeals regarding possible county liability for personal injuries caused by county
negligence in grading or paving a highway.
22. "The authority delegated both to counties and to municipalities represents a part of
the State sovereignty." Id. at 251, 3 S.E.2d at 574.
23. Id,
24. Id. "A distinction was therefore early drawn at common law with respect to suits
against counties and suits against municipalities ... ." Id.
25. Id.at 252, 3 S.E.2d at 575. The court cited the constitution's eminent domain provision and the historic statutory declaration that "a county is not liable to suit for any cause
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These general judicial reflections provide appropriate background for
reference to two familiar instances of reputed county "nuisance" liability.
The 1911 case of Nalley v. Carroll County's featured a complaint for
overflow water damage to land. The problem allegedly resulted from the
county's decision to permit a private party to place rocks in a county
roadbed crossing a stream.t With virtually no exposition of the basis of
the liability,"5 the court reversed the trial judge's dismissal and announced that under the allegations "both defendants were liable for the
damages caused by this maintenance of the nuisance."'2 The court emphasized, however, that defendant's demurrer had not raised "the question of the measure of damages recoverable; and no decision is made on
that subject.""0
1 returned the
Over fifty years later, DeKalb County v. McFarland"
court to the scene of its Na~ley generality. Plaintiff in McFarland complained of water run-off damage to his -residential property, resulting
from the county's construction of a spillway.83 The trial judge rejected a
general demurrer to plaintiff's allegations of both continuing nuisance
and eminent domain, and the county appealed.8 3 The point of appeal
could hardly have been more explicit: "the county can not be held liable
for maintaining a nuisance."'1' In response, a unanimous supreme court
relied exclusively upon its "full bench" decision in Nalley to sustain the
complaint.85 Pointedly, however, the court took note that plaintiff's "petition also alleges that the maintenance of this continuing nuisance
amounts to a taking of his property by the county without paying him
of action unless made so by statute," currently codified at O.C.G.A. § 36-1-4 (1987). 188 Ga.
at 250, 3 S.E.2d at 574. Finally, in answer to the certified question, the court held that
"there is no constitutional or statutory provision which can be taken to render a county
liable for a tort on account of personal injuries arising from a defect in a highway constructed or repaired by the county." Id. at 252, 3 S.E.2d at 575.
26. 135 Ga. 835, 70 S.E. 788 (1911).
27. Id. at 836, 70 S.E. at 789. Plaintiff brought his action against both the county and
the individual, Id.*
28. The court appeared more interested in properly construing the petition to allege
"maintenance" of the nuisance, rather than "creation." Id. at 837, 70 S.E. at 789.
29. Id. The court delineated that damages against the county were limited to the prior
twelve month period covered by the requisite notice of claim, and that damages against the
individual extended to four years from time of accrual. Id.
30. Id. at 838, 70 S.E. at 790.
31. 223 Ga. 196, 154 S.E.2d 203 (1967).
32. Id. at 197, 154 S.E.2d at 204. Plaintiff alleged construction of the spillway on a public road running adjacent to plaintiff's property. Id.
33. Id. at 199, 154 S.E.2d at 205.
34. Id.
35. "The petition under the full-bench decision in Nalley u. CarrollCounty,.. . states a
cause of action for legal relief." Id., 154 S.E.2d at 206.
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compensation."' 6 In this fashion, and as late as 1967, the bare "nuisance"
generality of Nalley received a considerable sharpening of focus7 by virtue
of eminent domain supplementation arising from McFarland.3
It was at this juncture that the supreme court also recharged municipal
nuisance liability with pulsating vitality. Because of subsequent history,
this account must briefly describe that event as well. Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips" originated with a petition alleging injury in an intersection collision resulting from a defective municipal traffic light which
periodically showed green on all four sides simultaneously.8 ' Plaintiff alleged the condition's existence for more than two weeks, to the knowledge
of the governing authorities, and the occurrence of six collisions at the
intersection on the day of his injury.40 In its epic 1968 decision, the supreme court held the petition to state a cause of action in nuisance."'
Virtually ignoring analytical difficulties in definition,'4 the court held
plaintiff's allegations to "set forth the operation and maintenance of a
defective condition that could work damage to anyone who came in proxa cause of action for
imity to it."4 Those allegations, no less, "set forth
4
the operation and maintenance of a nuisance." 4
The decision in Phillips opened the proverbial floodgates to nuisance
litigation against municipalities. Indeed, the ensuing twenty-three years
have provided a panoramic view of appellate judicial efforts to define, and
refine, the, evolving essence of a municipal nuisance.'
V.
The following decade (1970-1980) was an eventful one in the Georgia
law of county "nuisance," and account should be taken of the supreme
court's more notable endeavors of the era. A return of the McFarland
36. Id. at 200, 154 S.E.2d at 206.
37. Instructively, the court cited both Smith v. Floyd County and Barfield v. Macon
County, discussed at supra notes 9 and 17.
38. 224 Ga. 834, 165 S.E.2d 141 (1968).
39. Id. at 834, 165 S.E.2d at 142. For a more extended discussion of the case, see Sentell,
supra note 4.
40. 224 Ga. at 834, 165 S.E.2d at 142. The trial court sustained the municipality's general demurrer to the petition; the court of appeals reversed, 118 Ga. App. 62, 162 S.E.2d 771
(1968), and the supreme court granted certiorari.
41. 224 Ga. at 838, 165 S.E.2d at 144.
42. Rather, the court simply cited the language of the prevailing statute that "(a]nything
that works hurt, inconvenience or damage to another is a nuisance." Id. (citing Code § 72101, currently codified at O.C.G.A. § 41-1-1 (1991)).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. For a survey of those efforts through 1988, see P. SsErax.L, supra note 2, at 125-34.
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litigation,' for example, required the court's summary review of a plaintiff's jury verdict "for $1,000 special damages" and "$4,000 attorney
fees."' 7 Noting findings of "continuing nuisance" in the county's discharge of surface waters and failure to maintain a culvert, the court affirmed recovery of "specific damages.'4 As for attorney fees, the court

simply characterized as one of the issues the county's "continuing nuisance and trespass" after notice to desist.'

"Every intentional tort in-

vokes a species of bad faith," the court reasoned, "that entitles a person
wronged to recover the expenses of litigation including attorney fees." S°
In this conclusory fashion, therefore, McFarland(no. 2) allowed the damages for a "continuing nuisance," but one previously established as constituting a "taking," as well.
Considerably more informative, Williams v. Georgia Power Co." dealt
with a previously unpaved county road, which was officially closed when a
lake was constructed across it and subsequently paved by the county for
use as a boat launch.'2 His decedents having drowned when their car was
allegedly driven into the lake at night, plaintiff sought to escape the
county's immunity defense."' Arguing that "the county is liable in this
case for the maintenance of a nuisance," plaintiff relied "on the cases of
Nalley v. Carroll County, .

DeKalb County v. McFarland, ..

. and

Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips."" Rejecting plaintiff's position, the
court first distinguished Nalley and McFarland: those "cases involved
nuisances which amounted to takings of property by the counties without
paying the owners compensation. '"" As for Phillips, that "case involved a
municipality and not a county. '
With disposition of Williams, the court's message resoundingly confirmed two precepts: a county "nuisance" produced liability only when it
also constituted a "taking," and the nuisance evolution originating in
46.

DeKab County v. McFarland, 231 Ga. 649, 203 S.E.2d 495 (1974). In McFarland

(no. 1), it will be recalled that the court rejected the county's demurrer to plaintiff's charge
of continuing nuisance and eminent domain for water run-off damage to his property by
virtue of the county's construction of a spillway. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.

47. 231 Ga. at 649, 203 S.E.2d at 498. The jury had also awarded injunctive relief. Id.
48. Id. at 651, 203 S.E.2d at 499. The court said that the county had no "right to increase such water to the destruction of the plaintiff's property." Id. Presumably, therefore,
the "specific damages" were affirmed for the decrease of the property's market value.
49. Id.
50. Id. This was the extent of the court's attention to the matter.
51. 233 Ga. 517, 212 S.E.2d 348 (1975).
52. Id. at 517, 212 S.E.2d at 350. Plaintiff sued both the county and Georgia Power
Company, which constructed the lake. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 519, 212 S.E.2d at 351.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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Phillips applied only to municipalities. For local government nuisance responsibility, therefore, the nature of the governmental beast remained the
crucial determinant.
County nuisance litigation intensified in 1978 to prompt, during the
course of that single year, three of the supreme court's pivotal (and best
known) decisions. The first was Fulton County v. Baranan,' an appeal
from a jury's finding of "abatable nuisance" for county diversion of surface water onto plaintiff's property.56 In particular, the county protested
the award of punitive damages. Designating the issue one of "first impression," the court examined the "basis" of county liability in such cases and
expressly ascribed responsibility not to "torts" but to "condemnation." 5'
Accordingly, "the measure of damages is the actual depreciation in market value of the premises resulting from the work done and the effect
upon the property."'" That "measure," in turn, decided the issue: "Since
the damages recoverable in a case like the present one are a substitution
for the damages recoverable in a condemnation action, there is no constitutional or statutory authority for the recovery of punitive damages
against a county.""
On the heels of Baranan, the court confronted Miree v. United
States," a case composed of certified questions from the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals. One of those questions was whether the county's alleged negligent operation and maintenance of an airport, which resulted
in a plane crash, could render the county liable to affected parties under a
theory of nuisance.' 8 Refusing to allow nuisance liability to operate, a majority of the court considered the point well settled."4
57. 240 Ga. 837, 242 S.E.2d 617 (1978).
58. Id. at 837, 242 S.E.2d at 618. The diversion allegedly arose from the county's maintenance of a public road. Id.
59. Id. at 838, 242 S.E.2d at 619. The court anchored the action in the constitution's

eminent domain provision. In a concurring opinion, Justice Hill urged as an alternative
anchor the constitution's due process guarantee. Id. at 840, 242 S.E.2d at 619-20 (Hill, J.,
concurring).

60. Id. at 838, 242 S.E.2d at 619.
61.

Id. Accordingly, the court held that the trial judge had erred in submitting the issue

of punitive damages to the jury. Id.
62. 242 Ga. 126, 249 S.E.2d 573 (1978).
63. Id. at 126, 249 S.E.2d at 574. Plaintiffs alleged that the county maintained a garbage
dump at the airport which attracted immense flocks of birds and that the plane crashed
when its jet engines ingested a large number of the birds. Plaintiffs brought suits for the
plane's occupants, a burned victim on the ground, the owner of the plane, and the owner of
property at the crash site. Id.
64. The court reviewed the general liability postures of counties and municipalities with
the following quote:
Counties are subdivisions of the state government to which the state parcels its
duty of governing the people. They are local, legal, political subdivisions of the

10
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We have recognized in a number of cases that where a county causes a
nuisance to exist which amounts to a taking of property of one of its
citizens for public purposes, the county is liable .... However, when
the nuisance does not amount to a taking for public purposes the county
is not liable."

Apparently, therefore, the court perceived no "taking" to have occurred."a
Slightly more than a month following Miree, the court rendered its decision in the third case, Duffeld v. DeKalb County.e7 Plaintiffs in Duffield alleged that odors and noises from the county's sewage plant rendered their property unmarketable and sought damages for both inverse
condemnation and continuing nuisance.68 Reviewing the trial judge's summary judgment in favor of county immunity, the court was meticulous in
delineating the two claims. On the one hand, "the Constitution provides
for a waiver of sovereign immunity where a county creates a nuisance
which amounts to an inverse condemnation."0 9 Thus, the court held,
"[Tihe owners have clearly stated a claim of inverse condemnation in alleging that the odors and noise from the county's sewage plant have interfered with their right to use, enjoy, and dispose of their property. ' 70 On

the other hand, "[a] county, unlike a municipality, is not

. . .

generally

liable for creating nuisances."71 Accordingly, the court held, "the county
is not separately amenable to suit by the property owners on this basis,"'"

state, created out of its territory, and are arms of the state, created, organized,
and existing for civil and political purposes, particularly for the purposes of administering locally the general powers and policies of the state .... On the other
hand, municipalities are creatures of the legislature and their existence may be
established, altered, amended, enlarged or diminished, or utterly abolished by the
legislature.
Id. at 133, 249 S.E.2d at 578 (quoting Troup County Elec. Membership Corp. v. Georgia
Power Co., 229 Ga. 348, 352, 191 S.E.2d 33 (1972)).
65. Id. at 134, 249 S.E.2d at 578-79.
66. Id. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Hill, joined by Chief Justice Nichols and Justice
Jordan, maintained that the property damage claims were recoverable under the taking provision of the constitution, and that the due process guaranty should permit recovery for
personal injuries. Id.at 139, 249 S.E.2d at 581 (Nichols, C.J., Hill & Jordan, JJ., dissenting).
67. 242 Ga. 432, 249 S.E.2d 235 (1978).
68. Id. at 432, 249 S.E.2d at 236. Plaintiff's property was located across the river from
the county's plant; in addition to damages, they sought to enjoin the noise and odors as well
as further pollution of the river which they owned to its midline. Id.
69. Id. at 433, 249 S.E.2d at 236.
70. Id. at 434, 249 S.E.2d at 237. On this claim, therefore, the court reversed the trial
judge's summary judgment. Id. at 432, 249 S.E.2d at 236.
71. Id. The court observed that "[a]
municipality, whether exercising its governmental
or its ministerial functions is liable for creating a nuisance which damages property.".
and also health hazards." Id.at 434-35 n.2, 249 S.E.2d at 237 n.2.
72. Id. at 435, 249 S.E.2d at 237. The court said that it had found no "statute making
counties liable for nuisances hazardous to health." Id.
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and the trial judge "correctly granted 7' summary judgment on the property
owners' claim for a health nuisance. 3
For the law of county "nuisance" liability, therefore, the decade of the
1970s was both eventful and an emphatic reinforcement of the saga's earlier evolved doctrine. A nuisance itself was simply insufficient to precipitate liability, the decade declared; for county responsibility, the conduct
or condition must qualify as a "taking" under inverse condemnation.
Moreover, the decade vividly depicted the doctrine's two immediate
ramifications. First, county "nuisance" was by no means synonymous
with claimant injury or hardship: the concept did not encompass, for example, deaths from driving into a lake across a county road, damages or
deaths from a plane crash at the county airport, or health nuisances from
a county sewage plant. Second, damages for a county "nuisance" go exclusively to actual depreciation in market value of property: although this
theory might include attorney fees, it would not, being only a substitute
for a condemnation award, countenance punitive damages. Throughout
the decade, a bright line of demarcation distinguished county "nuisances"
from municipal ones.7
VI.
The supreme court fired the opening shot of the new decade with its
1980 decision in City of Columbus v. Myszka,7 5 another link in the court's
development of municipal nuisance. 7s Essentially, Myszka affirmed liability for the municipality's approval of uphill construction projects that in73. Id., 249 S.E.2d at 237-38.
74. The court of appeals was also meticulous in preserving the distinction during the
decade. In State Highway Dep't v. Barrett, 124 Ga. App. 703, 185 S.E.2d 624 (1971), for
example, the court refused to extend the nuisance liability of Phillips to the state highway
department. "The status of the State Highway Department is more like unto that of a
county; it cannot be equated to a municipality. It is an agency of the State and part of the
sovereign." Id. at 703, 185 S.E.2d at 625. Again, in Sheley v. Board of Pub. Educ., 132 Ga.
App. 314, 208 S.E.2d 126 (1974), the court would not permit the nuisance concept to encom-

pass an independent school system. The court said that "both the Supreme Court and this
court have declined to apply the doctrine of Town of Fort Oglethorpe v. Phillips . ..in
cases where tort liability was attempted to be fixed against governmental subdivisions other
than municipalities." Id. at 317, 208 S.E.2d at 129. Moreover, in decisions holding county
"nuisance" assertable, the court was careful to anchor the concept in eminent domain. For

example, in Ingram v. Baldwin County, 149 Ga. App. 422, 254 S.E.2d 429 (1979), the court
reversed summary judgment for the county in respect to two separate overflows of raw sewage in plaintiff's home. "It is therefore possible for a jury to find that the county was negli-

gent in its efforts to maintain the sewer line after the first overflow and thus created a
nuisance which resulted in a taking or damaging of appellant's property for a public purpose." Id. at 423, 254 S.E.2d at 430 (emphasis added).

75. 246 Ga. 571, 272 S.E.2d 302 (1980).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
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creased water run-off onto plaintiff's property.7 7 The court explained that
"this case falls into the category of cases in which the municipality has
chosen to act, that is, has chosen to approve construction projects, and
has acted, that is, has approved construction projects, which have given
rise to a nuisance . . . for which the city is liable."7
The court then initiated its review of the lower court's awards for actual damages, punitive damages, and expenses of litigation. As for litigation expenses, the court scored the municipality's failure to contest their
recoverability7 o and rejected the argument of insufficient supporting evidence.8 0 On punitive damages, the court appeared somewhat ambivalent.
On the one hand, it carefully distinguished the decision in Baranan in
which it had earlier refused to allow such damages against a county."1
Baranan was an inverse condemnation action, the court delineated, while
"[t]he present action is for nuisance.""2 On the other hand, "a majority of
this court adopts the rule that absent statutory authority, a municipality
cannot be held liable for punitive damages." 8 Finally, the court rejected
the city's contention that actual damages were restricted to depreciation
in the property's market value." "In a continuing, abatable nuisance
case," the court asserted, "the plaintiff is not limited to a recovery of
rental value or market value; rather, he may recover any special damages
whether the injury is of a temporary or a permanent nature."' Illustratively, the court relied upon Duffield" to declare that "[u]nlawful interference with the right of the owner to enjoy possession of his property
may be an element of damages." 8 7 It then cited a municipal case to emphasize that "[t)he measure of damages for 'discomfort, loss of peace of
77. 246 Ga. at 571, 272 S.E.2d at 304. The municipality had also knowingly allowed
human sewage to flow across plaintiff's property for many months. Id.
78. Id. at 572, 272 S.E.2d at 304. The court thereby rejected the municipality's argument
of "discretionary nonfeasance," that is, that it "'did nothing' rather than 'doing something.'" Id.
79. "The city does not contend that expenses of litigation are not recoverable from a
municipality." Id. at 573, 272 S.E.2d at 305.
80. "The evidence supports the award." Id.
81. Fulton County v. Baranan, 240 Ga. 837, 242 S.E.2d 617 (1978). See Supra text accompanying notes 57-66 for discussion of Baranan.
82. 246 Ga. at 573, 272 S.E.2d at 305.
83. Id. It was upon this point that Chief Justice Undercofler and Justice Nichols dissented. Id. at 574, 272 S.E.2d at 305 (Undercofler, C.J. & Nichols, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 573, 272 S.E.2d at 305.
85. Id.
86. Duffield v. DeKab County, 242 Ga. 432, 249 S.E.2d 235 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 67-73 for discussion of Duffield.
87. 246 Ga. at 573, 272 S.E.2d at 305.
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mind, unhappiness and annoyance' of the plaintiff caused by the mainte''s
nance of a nuisance is for the enlightened conscience of the jury."
The court's per curiam opinion in Myszka was intriguing in several respects. Although the case itself involved only municipal nuisance liability,
the opinion included county cases throughout in its aggregate listings of
supporting citations. Moreover, the court expressly employed two county
"nuisance" cases to buttress its decisions on damages. Those cases were
the court's 1978 decisions in Baranan" and DuffieldY' In Baranan, the
court had emphatically based county "nuisance" responsibility exclusively upon eminent domain, with the inevitable restriction of damages to
market value depreciation. Because those recoveries were but a "substitution" for condemnation awards, Baranan asserted, they necessarily precluded a recovery for punitive damages. Duffield, on the other hand, was
not a decision on damages; rather, it upheld the statement of a claim for
"inverse condemnation" from the county's interference with the "use and
enjoyment" of plaintiff's land. Interference with enjoyment of possession,
Duffield declared, rendered unnecessary an actual "physical invasion" of
the property.
Myszka's utilization of the two cases was striking. It employed
Baranan to demonstrate that the basis for a county "nuisance" could not
conceptually tolerate punitive damages but that the basis for a municipal
nuisance might. Although Myszka then proceeded to rule out municipal
punitive damages, it had thus made clear that it did so for other reasons,
reasons not underlying Baranan. The Myszka court's employment of
Barahan operated, therefore, to re-emphasize the established demarcation between county "nuisances" and municipal nuisances. In contrast,
Myszka's employment of Duffield appeared to thrust toward assimilation;
that is, Duffield's focus upon interference with enjoyment of possession
somehow supported recovery of municipal nuisance damages that were
not limited to property depreciation. But Duffield, as noted, did not deal
with the measure of damages; it held that interference with possession
constituted "property" invasion which could give rise to a claim in inverse
condemnation. Indeed, and ironically, Duffield explicitly took pains to
bottom its decision on inverse condemnation and to reject resoundingly
mere nuisance liability. Had it reached the point, Duffield logically could
have treated the interference as detracting from the value of the property, measuring damages accordingly. Assuredly, Duffield in no way sufficed as authority for Myszka's approval of "any special damages" for
nuisance.
88. Id. (quoting Mayor of Waynesboro v. Hargrove, 111 Ga. App. 26, 140 S.E.2d 286

(1965)).
89. 240 Ga. 837, 242 S.E.2d 617 (1978).
90. 242 Ga. 432, 249 S.E.2d 235 (1978).
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Almost immediately following its Myszka exercise, the court refocused
upon county "nuisance" liability in exceedingly routine fashion. Illustratively, the 1983 decision in Lewis v. DeKalb County was impressive by
virtue of its failure to find a nuisance. Lewis featured a property owner's
complaint, in both "continuing nuisance" and "taking without compensation," for flooding damage caused by the county's breach of a dam."1 Reviewing evidence of emergency conditions prompting decisions by state
and county officials that the dam must be breached,"' the court held that
the county acted "pursuant to its police powers."" Major premise thus in
place, conclusions followed as preordained. Because of police power authorization, there could be no inverse condemnation;9s because there was
no inverse condemnation, there could be no continuing nuisance."O Affirming summary judgment for the county, therefore, a unanimous supreme court in Lewis perpetuated its historic tradition of testing "nuisance" claims against counties by the prerequisites of eminent domain.
Some five months later, the court decided Wilmoth v. Henry County."
In an action for personal injuries from a fall, plaintiff in Wilmoth eschewed a claim in "nuisance," relying instead directly upon eminent domain. In compelling her to visit the county courthouse for jury service,
and thereby exposing her to negligently maintained premises, plaintiff
charged that the county had "taken". her private property for a public
purpose.' 8 Affording the complaint the shortest of shrift, the court emphasized the analytical tension between personal injury and condemnation. For the latter, "[the damage recoverable . .. is the decrease in
market value," 9 the court delineated, and "this principle is not applica91. 251 Ga. 100, 303 S.E.2d 112 (1983).
92. Id. at 100, 303 S.E.2d at 113. Plaintiff also alleged improper maintenance of a drainage ditch, but the court turned that complaint aside by finding that the county had never
assumed responsibility for the ditch. Id. at 101-02, 303 S.E.2d at 114.
93. Id. at 102-03, 303 S.E.2d at 115. State officials had previously determined the dam to
be in a dangerous condition, and subsequent heavy rains prompted the county's declaration
of a state of emergency and an order that a notch be cut into the dam's face to relieve the
pressure. Id. at 102, 303 S.E.2d at 115.
94. Id. at 103, 303 S.E.2d at 115.
95. "The provisions of the Constitution of Georgia ... prohibiting the taking of private
property for a public purpose without compensation have no relevance to the exercise of the
police powers by the state or its political subdivisions." d.
96. "Since . . .this constituted an exercise of the police power during an emergency
rather than a taking of private property for a public purpose, this action cannot amount to
the creation of a nuisance." Id.
97. 251 Ga. 643, 309 S.E.2d 126 (1983).
98. "She contends that the injury to her person is a taking of private property arising
out of her presence on jury duty, a public purpose." Id. at 643, 309 S.E.2d at 127.

99. Id.
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ble to actions for personal injury damages."' 0 Indeed, the concept of the
sovereign's eminent domain power "does not contemplate the 'taking' of a
human being.lO1 Accordingly, "a county may not be sued under the theory of eminent domain in a tort action for personal injury where the
county would otherwise be authorized to assert its civil immunity." 10'
As of 1983, therefore, Lewis and Wilmoth beamed significantly scintillating signals of "law as usual" respecting county "nuisance" liability. If
unsupported by inverse condemnation, the liability disappeared; if supported by inverse condemnation, the liability incurred the baggage of
condemnation's conceptual restrictions:
It was at this juncture that the supreme court, purporting to follow the
signals of the past, emitted the epoch's most confusing sparks of analytical uncertainty. The occasion was the 1984 case of Fulton County v.
Wheaton,e' an action for flood damage to plaintiffs' home. "The trial
court found the county liable for maintaining a continuing nuisance
which constituted a total taking of [plaintiffs'] property and awarded
damages in an amount equal to the fair market value of the property."1 '
Reviewing the evidence,10 s the court quoted its Miree pronouncement
that "'[w]here a county causes a nuisance to exist which amounts to a
taking of property of one of its citizens for public purposes, the county is
liable.' "" Finding that the county clearly knew of the flooding problems
caused by both its approval of upstream developments and its failure to
a specified culvert, the court affirmed the county's liability for
maintain
,,nuisance.',1o7

100. Id.
101. Id. "In ruling such eminent domain claims inapplicable in personal injury actions, it
has been reasoned that the state may not authorize its agents to cause physical injury to any
person for public purposes." Id. at 643-44, 309 S.E.2d at 127.
102. Id. at 644, 309 S.E.2d at 127. The court thus affirmed the trial judge's dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint. Chief Justice Hill and Justice Smith dissented without separate opinions. Id.
103. 252 Ga. 49, 310 S.E.2d 910 (1984).
104. Id. at 49-50, 310 S.E.2d at 911.
105. Evidence revealed that a creek on plaintiffs' property had periodically inundated
their property and, on one occasion, their home; that the problem resulted from a defectively maintained culvert over which the county had assumed responsibility; and that the
problem was compounded by increased water run-off from a condominium development and
a subdivision, both of which the county had undisputably approved. Id. at 50, 310 S.E.2d at
911.
106. Id. (quoting Miree v. United States, 242 Ga. 126, 249 S.E.2d 573 (1978)). For treatment of Miree, see supra text accompanying notes 62-66.
107. 252 Ga. at 50, 310 S.E.2d at 911. Unaccountably, the court said that "liability of a
municipality cannot arise solely from its approval of construction projects which increase
surface water runoff. Rather, it is the county's failure to maintain properly the culvert,

resulting in a nuisance, which creates its liability." Id.
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As to damages, however, the court held "fair market value" an inappropriate measure.' 0 s Rather, the court quoted its stricture in Wilmoth that
"'[t]he damage recoverable . ..is the decrease in market value and is
governed by rules for damages in a condemnation action.' "109 Additionally, however, the court supplemented with the following quote from
Myszka: "'In a continuing, abatable nuisance case, the plaintiff is not
limited to a recovery of rental value or market value; rather, he may recover any special damages whether the injury is of a temporary or a permanent nature.' "10 Reversing and remanding, the court called for "a jury
determination of damages to the Wheatons' property consistent with our
holdings in Wilmoth and Myszka. 11
The court's cryptic opinion in Wheaton comprised a perplexing amalgamation of the past and the unknown. By far, most of what the court
said and did constituted nothing more than confirmation of seemingly
settled principles. Thus, the declared county "nuisance" emphatically
constituted a "total taking" of plaintiffs' property, and the quote from
Miree clearly stressed that precise requirement. Moreover, reversal of the
"fair market value" measure of damages, and substitution of "market
value decrease," was soundly in keeping with precedent. Indeed, the
court's supporting quotation from Wilmoth explicitly exemplified condemnation's control of damage calculus.
It was the Wheaton court's final supplementation that tripped the analytical alarm. Quoting Myszka's authorization of "any special damages"
for a continuing abatable nuisance, simply did not compute in the Wheaton context. Directing jury determination of damages on the basis of that
authorization stood in square contradiction to more than one hundred
years of doctrinal development. Myszka, first and foremost, dealt exclusively with a declared municipal nuisance; the decision constituted a link
in the line of evolution begun in 1968 with the municipal nuisance renaissance of Phillips. As previously observed, the Phillips' progeny's most
distinctive facets were adamant differentiations of municipal and county
nuisances and insistence that the latter depended upon an eminent domain foundation.
108. The court thus reversed the trial judge's award of damages. Id. at 51, 310 S.E.2d at
912.
109. Id. at 51, 310 S.E.2d at 911 (quoting Wilmoth v. Henry County, 251 Ga. 643, 309
S.E.2d 126 (1983)). For treatment of Wilmoth, see supra text accompanying notes 97-102.
110. 252 Ga. at 51, 310 S.E.2d at 911-12 (quoting City of Columbus v. Myszka, 246 Ga.
571, 573, 272 S.E.2d 302 (1980)). For treatment of Myszka, see supra text accompanying
notes 75-91.
111. 252 Ga. at 51, 310 S.E.2d at 912. All the justices concurred except for Chief Justice
Hill, who did not participate in the decision.
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Although discussion of municipal damages in Myszka elicited support
from two county "nuisance" decisions (Barananand Duffield), the discussion was somewhat self-contradictory. The court employed Baranan to
re-emphasize the municipal-county distinction and to expressly ground
county "nuisance" in the damage law of eminent domain. Admittedly,
Myszka's deployment of Duffield augured toward assimilation, but the
perceived analogy appeared flawed on the surface. Duffield was not based
on damages and in no way sufficed to approve "any special damages,"
even for a municipal nuisance. Much less could Duffield logically undergird Myszka as authority for Wheaton's approval of "any special damages" for a county "nuisance." Confusion, it appeared, had compounded
confusion.
Whatever may have accounted for the apparently inexplicable lapse in
logic of Wheaton, the supreme court gave no indication that it had consciously changed the rules in county "nuisance" law. As observed, in the
more than three-year interval between Myszka and Wheaton, the court
routinely refocused upon highly traditional themes. If Wheaton obliterated those themes, it was a strikingly abrupt reversal of field, delivered in
a strikingly disguised manner of message. After Wheaton, the court held
its silence on the issue for the remainder of the decade.
The court of appeals likewise revealed no recognition of doctrinal
movement. In the years immediately following Wheaton, the court decided several cases in the county liability arena.112 Not only did it fail to
register analytical revolution, as late as 1987 it retraced legal history in
classic fashion:
Normally, "la] county is not liable to suit for any cause of action unless
made so by statute." This includes actions brought under a theory of
negligence as well as actions brought under a theory of nuisance, unless,
of course, the alleged nuisance amounts to a taking of private property
for public purposes.11
14
That formulation carried the court through the next three years.,

112. See, e.g., Bray v. Houston County, 180 Ga. App. 166, 348 S.E.2d 709 (1986) (denying recovery for damage to plaintiff's truck occurring during a search for a crime weapon on
grounds of police power immunity).
113. Early County v. Fincher, 184 Ga. App. 47, 49, 360 S.E.2d 602, 604 (1987) (quoting
O.C.G.A. § 36-1-4, and citing Miree v. United States, 242 Ga. 126, 249 S.E.2d 573 (1978))
(citation omitted) (action for personal injury and death allegedly resulting from embankment at dead-end of county road, the court reversing trial judge's exclusion of certain
evidence).
114. See, e.g., Desprint Serves., Inc. v. DeKab County, 188 Ga. App. 218, 372 S.E.2d 488
(1988) (denying recovery in an action for nuisance and eminent domain for damage to plaintiffs property resulting from a ruptured water main); DeKab County v. Glaze, 189 Ga. App.
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VII.
The year 1990 arrived with a jurisprudential jolt for Georgia counties.
For the historically somber saga of county "nuisance" responsibility, the
wolf of judicial reconsideration appeared on the doorstep. A chilling wind
of potential common law change cascaded across the local government
landscape, numbing with anxiety the keepers of county coffers and invigorating with exhilaration the protesters of county wrongs. A century-old,
definitive demarcation between governmental beasts found itself up for
analytical grabs. Events converged to target that demarcation for either
obliterating rejection or conclusive reaffirmation. The issue was focused,
the stakes were large, and the concerns were pervasive. Whatever the ultimate outcome, the occasion would leave its permanent mark on the
corpus of local government law.
The catalyst's conveyance, DeKalb County v. Orwig,115 originated with
a utility company's obstruction of the county's main sewer line. Upon a
resulting sewage backup into plaintiffs home, the county failed to discover the obstruction, insisting that the problem lay in plaintiffs own
plumbing system.'1 When, some three weeks later, large amounts of raw
sewage again flooded plaintiffs home, the county did detect and remove
the obstruction. Plaintiff sued the county in nuisance for its alleged negligence, and the county denied liability. The trial judge permitted plaintiff's nuisance action but, upon the jury's finding that the county was negligent, disallowed damages for pain and suffering and emotional
distress."' Both parties appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals. The
march on the doctrinal dichotomy had commenced.
Orwig perfectly focused the issue, framed, moreover, by both its ramifications. On responsibility, the county denied a liability-producing "nuisance" on grounds that it had engaged in no inverse condemnation.Il On
damages, the trial court allowed the nuisance action, but "disallowed
1, 375 S.E.2d 66 (1988) (upholding jury award of damages for diminution in value of plaintiffs property occurring as a result of county's redesign of an intersection).
115. 196 Ga. App. 255, 395 S.E.2d 824 (1990). Georgia Power Company had driven a
metal grounding rod from a power pole directly into the center of the sewer line a few feet
downstream from the intersection of the line and plaintiff's lateral line. Id. at 255, 395
S.E.2d at 825.
116. Id. The county reached that conclusion despite plaintiff's expert's insistence to the
contrary.
117. Id. The court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of evidence of Georgia Power's
payment to plaintiff in exchange for a release. The court held that the damage was not the
result of conduct of joint tortfeasors and that O.C.G.A. § 51-12-1(b) (1982 & Supp. 1991)
(allowing collateral source evidence) was not in effect at the time of the incident. 196 Ga.
App. at 255, 395 S.E.2d at 815.
118. "[Dlefendant ...contends inter alia that it cannot be liable at all because its operation and maintenance of the sewer main, as a nuisance or otherwise, did not amount to a
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damages to plaintiff for pain and suffering and emotional distress, because such injuries are not compensable in condemnation cases." 119 On
both prongs, therefore, eminent domain's historic domination of county
"nuisance" loomed large, and the occasion's significance was not lost upon
the court of appeals: "These appeals involve serious, obfuscatory attacks
upon the imposition on the county of any liability,"120 Already, the court
had tipped its hand.
To its credit, the court explicitly acknowledged the supreme court's familiar precepts that a
county may be liable .. .for damages for maintenance of a nuisance,

only upon the basis of an "inverse condemnation," defined as consequential damages to property "because of public improvements," or in
connection with a project for public improvement .... And, "when the

nuisance does not amount to a taking for public purposes the county is
not liable. ' 1" 1
The court conceded those decisions to conclude "that damages recoverable in such cases are 'a substitution for the damages recoverable in a
condemnation action [and] there is no constitutional or statutory authority for the recovery of punitive damages against a county' . . . or any
other damages other than damage to property as in a condemnation
,,
case. 122
With past as prelude, the court of appeals first addressed the issue of
liability. It discovered the supreme court's "latest pronouncements" on
that issue in Fulton County v. Wheaton,12 ' in which the court had relied
upon City of Columbus v. Myszka,' s2 first to find a nuisance and then to
approve recoverability of "any special damages."'" The court of appeals
taking of plaintiff's property for public purpose, and hence was not an 'inverse condemnation."' 196 Ga. App. at 257, 395 S.E.2d at 826.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 256, 395 S.E.2d at 825.
121. Id., 395 S.E.2d at 826 (citing and quoting Duffield v. DeKalb County, 242 Ga. 432,
249 S.E.2d 235 (1978); Fulton County v. Baranan, 240 Ga. 837, 838, 242 S.E.2d 617, 619
(1978); Miree v. United States, 242 Ga. 126, 134, 249 S.E.2d 573, 579 (1978); Williams v.
Georgia Power Co., 233 Ga. 517, 519, 212 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1975)) (citation omitted).
122. Id. at 257, 395 S.E.2d at 826 (citing and quoting Baranan, 240 Ga. at 838, 242
S.E.2d at 619; Wilmoth v. Henry County, 251 Ga. 643, 309 S.E.2d 126 (1983)) (citation
omitted).
123. 252 Ga. 49, 310 S.E.2d 910 (1984).
124. 246 Ga. 571, 272 S.E.2d 302 (1980).
125. It thus appears that the rule allowing county liability only for "inverse condemnation," which is a "taking for public purpose," evolved judicially and perhaps fictitiously as the sole exception to sovereign immunity, under the vestment
of condemnation laws, there being no other means of holding the county liable.
The early cases extrapolated the theory of eminent domain to include liability for
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discounted Myszka's exclusive concern with a municipality, reasoning
that Smith v. Floyd County 2 6 had demonstrated that "as to the principles of loss of immunity such distinction between county and municipality is not valid."" 7 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court in Fulton County v. Wheaton has recognized implicitly that the concept of allowing liability only where there is a "taking
for public purpose," although tailored to the first such cases, is an artificial distinction, insofar as the cases have allowed recovery for. and special
damages for nuisance which 2is not an "inverse condemnation," i.e., is not
a taking for public purpose. 2
From rationale, the court of appeals moved to conclusion:
We conclude... upon the resolving factors of Fulton County v. Wheaton,. . . that a county may be liable in a civil action for the maintaining

of a nuisance upon the requisite proof of failure to properly maintain
public works, without regard to whether such act is incidental to a taking
for public purpose or public improvements; that is without the necessity
to prove "inverse condemnation." 119
The deed done, the court announced that the issue of recoverable damages "is thus settled."'18 0
According to Fulton County v. Wheaton, and see Smith v. Floyd
County, . . the rule exposing a city to liability for "any special dam-

ages" applies likewise to the county- "'In a continuing abatable nuisance
case, the plaintiff ...may recover any special damages whether the injury is of a temporary or a permanent nature.' City of Columbus v.
Myszka."'M'

Upon a new trial, the court of appeals directed that the trial judge should
allow evidence of mental distress, attorney fees, and mental pain and suffering "inasmuch as this case is not governed by condemnation law."' 2
a "nuisance" which in those cases did, as it happened, occur as a result of some
public improvement or in connection with some public project.
196 Ga. App. at 257, 395 S.E.2d at 827 (citation omitted).
126. 85 Ga. 420, 11 S.E. 850 (1890).
127. 196 Ga. App. at 258, 395 S.E.2d at 827 (citing Smith v. Floyd County, 85 Ga. 420,
11 S.E., 850 (1890)).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. (quoting Fulton County v. Wheaton, 252 Ga. 49, 51, 310 S.E.2d 910, 911-12
(1984)) (citation omitted).
132. Id. at 259, 395 S.E.2d at 828.
The trial court did not err in submitting the case to the jury on the question of
the county's maintenance of an abatable nuisance, but erred in refusing to allow
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Suddenly, therefore, the Georgia Court of Appeals resoundingly rejected the historical distinction between municipal nuisances and county
"nuisances." Assimilating the latter to the former, the court in Orwig decisively recrafted both analytical prongs of the county's traditional advantage. 183 As to liability, county "nuisance" no longer required the tests of
eminent domain; the liability operated rather as a separate and independent one; no technical "taking" was necessary; and past problems in establishing the claim lessened markedly. As to recovery, claimants against
the county found freedom from the previous confines of condemnation
damages; depreciation in market value of property ceased its domination
of the issue; and the lush oasis of "any special damages" beckoned enticingly. County government must now anticipate, and its coffers accommodate, the vicissitudinous vagaries of "mental pain and suffering and emotional distress."
As observed, the court of appeals professed not to declare but only to
discover. The court merely reported a doctrinal casualty which the supreme court had previously inflicted. Although completely unaware of the
momentous event, local government law had actually been operating
without one of its most historic dichotomies for a period of six years. The
messenger was not responsible for the message.
The overwhelming importance of some messages, however, does inevitably reflect upon the messenger. Discovering and reporting, like reading
and interpretation, entail their own share of creativity, a creativity defying relegation to passivity. This truism receives perfect illustration from
the court of appeals "discovery" in Orwig. That court's persistence in following an analytical trail that had grown cold with time, and in detecting
there the supreme court's "implicit" reversal of a position explicitly embraced for more than a century, deserved recognition.
As described, the court of appeals extracted that reversal completely
and exclusively from the supreme court's 1984 decision in Wheaton.15 ' As
previously analyzed, however, the exercise in Wheaton was far more
traditional than it was revolutionary. 5 5 Wheaton's declared county "nuisance" also emphatically constituted a "total taking" of property; indeed,
the decision expressly relied upon the explicit requirement of eminent domain set forth in Miree. 3 In respect to damages as well, Wheaton inthe jury to consider the question of an award of damages for mental pain and
suffering or emotional distress and attorney fees.
Id. The court was of the view that nuisance responsibility could cover only the second sewage backup.
133. Id. at 255, 395 S.E.2d at 824.
134. Fulton County v. Wheaton, 252 Ga. 49, 310 S.E.2d 910 (1984).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 103-13.
136. 252 Ga. at 49, 310 S.E.2d at 910.
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sisted upon the measure of decrease in market value, hoisting Wilmoth's
express damage assimilation of "nuisance" and condemnation. 37 Admittedly, Wheaton did confusingly supplement permissible recovery by quoting the Myszka decision's approval of "any special damages," a supplementation seemingly flawed on two fronts. First, Myszka involved only a
municipal nuisance. Second, Myszka's own derivation of damages authority was questionable; much less could it logically undergird Wheaton.'3 "
Although it did not address the latter point, the court of appeals in
Orwig discounted the municipal complexion of Myszka by asserting that
"the earliest analysis, Smith v. Floyd County, . . . concluded that as to
the principles of loss of immunity such distinction between county and
municipality is not valid."'' Remarkably, as previously recounted, Smith
stands for, and has historically been cited to sustain, the opposite position."4 The court's assimilation of municipal and county liability in
Smith went exclusively to responsibility under the 1877 Georgia Constitution's eminent domain provision."" It was "in this respect," Chief Justice Bleckley pointedly proclaimed, that local governments stood "upon
an equal footing. ' 14 2 Indeed, not satisfied to leave the point, the Chief
Justice then proceeded to expressly exclude "nuisance" from his analysis;
he specifically reaffirmed that exclusion by confining recoverable damages
in the case to "the actual depreciation in value (in the market value) of
the plaintiff's premises.""1' 3 The 1890 Smith, treated by Chief Justice
Bleckley, and the 1990 Smith, treated by the court of appeals in Orwig,
would scarcely have recognized each other.
In deciding Orwig, therefore, the Georgia Court of Appeals had surpassed by considerable margin a mere discovery and report of settled
phenomenon. Rather, the court had ferreted from supreme court decisions on the issue an alternative to one of the most historic delineations
in Georgia local government liability. Conceding a century of evolution
pointing primarily to the contrary, the court viewed the "latest pronouncements" to reveal the delineation as artificial, historically unfounded, and invalid." Nuisance law could, after all, operate upon municipalities and counties indistinguishably, relegating the past century to
137.
138.
sion of
139.
140.
case at
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
City of Columbus v. Myszka, 246 Ga. 571, 272 S.E.2d 302 (1980). See supra discusthe case at text accompanying notes 75-91.
DeKalb County v. Orwig, 196 Ga. App. 255, 258, 395 S.E.2d 824, 827 (1990).
Smith v. Floyd County, 85 Ga. 420, 11 S.E. 850 (1890). See supra discussion of the
text accompanying notes 9-16.
85 Ga. at 424-25, 11 S.E. at 851.
Id. at 425, 11 S.E. at 851.
Id.
DeKalb County v. Orwig, 196 Ga. App. 255, 257-58, 395 S.E.2d 824, 826-27 (1990).
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a transitional footnote. If the supreme court could but follow, the court of
appeals would lead the way to local government nuisance universality.
VIII.
Nine months later,"' the Georgia Supreme Court rendered its review of
the court of appeals "discovery" in DeKalb County v. Orwig. ' " Would
the court confirm or disavow the feat attributed to it: the obliteration of a
bedrock distinction in the Georgia "law" of "local government"?
Whatever the court's response, the saga of a century awaited definitive
culmination.
The supreme court's opinion wasted no time or energy in setting the
stage and acknowledging the characters. The court of appeals had "interpreted" its decision in Wheaton "as broadening the scope" of county nuisance liability, the court posited."' Accordingly, "[wie issued a writ of
certiorari to consider whether a county can be liable for a nuisance which
does not rise to the level of a taking of property ....."I'l Preliminarily,
therefore, the point could scarcely have been more pithily postulated.
Having isolated Wheaton as the source of derivation, the court immediately proceeded to emphasize the tension-taut themes of that decision.
On the one hand, Wheaton employed as "useful background" the limitation of damages "to those recoverable in a condemnation action" expressed in Duffield.14 ' On the other hand, Wheaton's quotation of language from Myszka concerning "any special damages" was unwarranted;
indeed, that quotation, the court declared, "is disapproved."' 150 Stressing
the court's exclusive concern with a municipal nuisance in Myszka, the

145. The court of appeals decided Orwig on June 11, 1990. That court denied motions
for rehearings on June 21 and July 9, 1990. The supreme court granted certiorari on Sep-

tember 27, 1990 and heard oral arguments in November 1990, The supreme court then rendered its decision on March 15, 1991.
146. 261 Ga. 137, 402 S.E.2d 513 (1991).
147.

Id. at 137, 402 S.E.2d at 514.

148. Id.
149. Id. The court quoted from Duffield as follows: "[Clertain nuisance suits for injunction and damages could be maintained against a county under the constitutional provisions
against taking or damaging private property for public'purposes." Id. at 138, 402 S.E.2d at
514. For discussion of Duffield v. DeKalb County, 242 Ga. 432, 249 S.E.2d 235 (1978), see
supra text accompanying notes 67-73.
150. 261 Ga. at 138, 402 S.E.2d at 514. "Therefore, insofar as it supports the notion that
a full range of damages is available to a plaintiff in a suit against a county based on the
maintenance of a nuisance, the language in Fulton County v. Wheaton quoting from City of
Columbus v. Myszka is disapproved." Id. For discussion of City of Columbus v. Myszka, 246

Ga. 571, 272 S.E.2d 302 (1980), see supra text accompanying notes 75-91.
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court returned to Duffield for the point that "principles relating to the
liability of municipalities do not apply equally to counties."11
Predilections in place, the supreme court held Wheaton "not susceptible" to the court of appeals "interpretation." 1'5 Accordingly, the answer
to the question under certiorari was "no: a county can not be liable for a
nuisance which does not rise to the level of a taking of property." 153 In
turn, the court concluded, "damages in cases such as this one cannot include such items as damages for mental distress and expenses of litigation."' " By virtue of a five-to-two majority, 1ss therefore, the supreme
court reversed the court of appeals decisions that suits for county nuisances need not be brought as inverse condemnation actions and that
their measure of damages is other than the measure for condemnation
cases. 166
The significance of the supreme court's decision in Orwig can hardly be
overstated. The result was by no means a foregone conclusion. Given the
tenor of the times producing the dichotomy, and the uncertainties natu151. 261 Ga. at 138, 402 S.E.2d at 514.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. This is a conservative count, for Justice Weltner was the only clear dissenter on this
issue. Although he disagreed with the majority's analysis of prior decisions, primarily Duffield, he also acknowledged the result of the majority decision:
[W]e have authenticated a bizarre dichotomy between counties and cities. Hence,
cities are liable for the full range of damages actually incurred by the victim of a
city-created "nuisance." Counties, however, are shielded from all claims for dam.
ages except those allowable against a condemning authority in the exercise of its
power of eminent domain.
Id. at 141, 402 S.E.2d at 516 (Weltner, J., dissenting).
Although also dissenting, Justice Fletcher's brief opinion focused exclusively upon
whether the county had been guilty of any nuisance at all: "I would hold that, as a matter of
law, two occurrences of sewage backing up do not constitute a continuing nuisance ....
Because the acts complained of here are neither continuous nor regularly repetitious, I respectfully dissent." Id. (Fletcher, J., dissenting). Accordingly, it was unnecessary for Justice
Fletcher to express an opinion, and he apparently refrained from doing so, on the validity of
the municipal-county "nuisance" dichotomy.
156. Having concluded thai there could be no county "nuisance" absent condemnation,
the court proceeded to inquire whether there had been a county "taking" in the circumstances of Orwig. On that issue, the court reasoned as follows:
Since there was some evidence in the record to support a finding that DeKalb
County knew or should have known after the first overflow that the obstruction
was in its line, there is a question of fact whether the county was responsible for
the second overflow and, thereby, for maintaining a nuisance amounting to a taking of Orwig's property. It follows that DeKalb County was not entitled to a directed verdict as to liability on that ground.
Id. at 139, 402 S.E.2d at 515. As noted above, Justice Fletcher's disagreement on this point
is clear.
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rally surrounding it over so lengthy a history, abolition loomed as a distinct possibility. If the supreme court possessed the will, the court of appeals had provided a way. That court had discovered an implied
repudiation; all the supreme court needed to contribute was confirmation.
If change awaited occasion, the opportunity was at hand. Indeed, a more
inviting opportunity appeared unlikely.
The supreme court's overwhelming rejection of that opportunity was
thus all the more impressive. In the midst of modern tendencies toward
local government assimilation, the decision forcefully reasserted the historical perception of dichotomy. The distinctive nature of the governmental beast, the court dramatically demonstrated, still materially matters. It
matters, moreover, in the legal tinderbox of local government liability. At
a time when the wagons of sovereign immunity are circled, the court reenforced a countering local government delineation. As contrasted with
municipal nuisances, that delineation dictates, county "nuisances" are decidedly more difficult to establish and typically productive of less recoverable damages. On both analytical prongs, the distinction demands, inverse condemnation continues its historic domination. For defenders of
county coffers and advocates of nuisance claimants, Orwig beams a beacon of landmark translucence.
Remarkably, therefore, the municipal-county nuisance distinction
stands stronger in 1991 than at any point in its one-hundred-year history.
For that history, while unmistakably recorded, also unmistakably encompassed its own share of occasional analytical glitches. Those discordances
combined over a period of time to render performance of the overall "nuisance" theme an exercise lacking in complete confidence. To be sure, the
supreme court appears correct in characterizing Wheaton as misinterpreted by the court of appeals. Yet Wheaton itself, it must be acknowledged, fell far short as a model of analytical clarity. Once the supreme
court erroneously employed Duffield in Myszka, and then compounded
that confusion in Wheaton, the court itself had virtually invited misinterpretation. Although the court subsequently indicated "law as usual," it
had, by that juncture, created its own doctrinal Frankenstein.
Orwig thus presented the supreme court with clear and vitally important options. The court could magnify the historical uncertainties, put the
best face on the judicial confusion, and capitalize upon the court of appeals' attempt to obliterate the dichotomy. Alternatively, it could emphasize the historical consistency, "disapprove" the self-created confusion,
and condemn obliteration as misinterpretation. In overwhelmingly selecting-and forcefully executing-the latter option, the supreme court appears conclusively to have placed the dichotomy beyond realistic challenge. As it long has been, it is now even more so.
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Question: "What is the law of local government nuisances?"
Answer: "What local government?"

[Vol. 43

